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THE NATIONAL AGENDA FOR HEALTH CARE
REFORM: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR POOR
AMERICANS?
Theodore R. Marmor*
INTRODUCTION
The reform of American medical care undeniably has ar-
rived at the very top of the nation's political agenda. What
health care reform means for poor Americans has not, howev-
er, had a central place within that agenda. This Symposium,
therefore, deserves praise for raising this important question.
My approach to addressing the health reform-poverty issue is
indirect: I first want to discuss the prospects for success and
disappointment in health reform generally. This is not because
I believe the implications of reform for poor Americans are of
secondary importance. To the contrary, I believe that the fate
of poor Americans depends crucially on how adequate the ar-
chitecture of reform is for all Americans, poor or rich, insured
or not.
Although this Article will address the central standards by
which reform proposals like it should be judged, its objective is
not to describe or to evaluate the Clinton Administration's
proposal. Rather, its purpose is to characterize, and criticize,
the way the United States has debated medical care reform
* Professor of Public Policy & Management, Yale University School of
Organization and Management. The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable
research of his undergraduate Research Assistant, Jessica Bartell. Portions of this
article are drawn from published and unpublished work of the author. For
example, Part II. is taken in part from my article entitled The History of Health
Care Reform, 58 ROLL CALL 20, 40 (1993). Much of the general information and
argument comes from the introductory chapter of my forthcoming Yale Press Book.
UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE REFOPi (forthcoming 1994). Part IV
draws on the introduction to a special issue of The Journal of Health Politics,
Policy & Law on the disadvantaged. Deborah A. Stone & Theodore R. Marmor,
Introduction, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 253 (1990). Though co-authored, the
special issue's introduction was drafted initially by Professor Stone and is used in
this article with her permission.
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and to suggest ways to improve the prospects of meaningful
reform for all Americans. This Article questions the structure
of a workable form of universal health insurance and its proper
response to the special needs and wants of the disadvantaged.
This Article begins with the question of agenda formation
and examines how health reform came to the fore of public
discussion by the early 1990s. Part II then considers how one
can make sense of our contemporary debate and how to think
about the formulation of what is at issue-the labels, the
ideas, and the range of specific proposals. Part III offers guide-
lines for adequate reform and a restructured health care de-
bate. Finally, Part IV addresses directly the issue of whether
health reforms targeted to the problems of the poor and other
disadvantaged groups are preferable to universal reforms that
ignore income classes in their fundamental design of entitle-
ment and benefits.
I. THE RISE OF THE HEALTH REFORM MOVEMENT AND THE
NEED TO SEIZE THE MOMENT
Precisely how and why health reform came to national
prominence in 1991-92 is not self-evident. After all, the nation
had been told since at least the early 1970s that American
medicine was in "crisis."1 Polling studies indicate that most
citizens accepted this critical view long before the nation's
political leaders began to offer serious plans for fundamental
reform.2 Moreover, while inflation of medical costs outdis-
tanced general consumer price increases in the early 1990s,
this gap was even wider during the first Reagan Administra-
1 See, e.g., Edward Kennedy, IN CRITICAL CONDITION (1972); Theodore R.
Marmor, American Health Politics, 1970 to the Present: Some Comments, 31 Q.
REV. ECON. & BUS. 32 (1990); Theodore R. Marmor, American Medical Policy and
the "Crisis" of the Welfare State: A Comparative Perspective, 11 J. HEALTH POL.
POLY & L. 617 (1986).
2 This is a common theme in much of the polling literature. See, e.g., Robert
Blendon & Karen Donelan, The Public and the Emerging Debate over National
Health Insurance, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 208 (1990); see also Lawrence R. Jacobs
& Robert Y. Shapiro, Public Opinion's Tilt Against Private Enterprise, 13 HEALTH
AFF. 285, 286-88 (1994); Lawrence R. Jacobs et al., Poll Trends: Medical Care in
the United States, 57 PUB. OPINION Q. 394 (1993); The Duality of Public Opinion:
Personal Interests and the National Interest in Health Care Reform, 2 DOMESTIC
AFF. 245 (1993).
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tion, when, according to the conventional political wisdom,
universal health insurance was unthinkable.'
Why major reform is not only conceivable now but also the
major domestic preoccupation of the Clinton Administration
has many answers, but no simple ones. By mid-1991, decreas-
ing international pressures as a result of the end of the Cold
War and the military triumph in Iraq made domestic issues far
more salient. Hospitals awash in red ink, workers "locked" into
jobs for fear of losing access to health insurance, fraudulent
billing practices by some hospitals, doctors, and laboratories,
and nightmarish stories of uninsured persons driven into bank-
ruptcy were all part of the medical care commentary of the
early 1990s.4 Moreover, as the data below demonstrate, the
cost of medical care has continued to rise relentlessly along
with the number of Americans uninsured against those costs
(see Table 1 and Figure 1).
But it was the 1992 presidential race with the presence of
a Democratic challenger committed to reforming American
medicine that transformed the country's medical problems into
front-page news.5 Given that prominence, a bidding war over
policy remedies was inevitable, both among the three presiden-
tial candidates and less obviously, among the policy intellectu-
als who, for more than two decades, had been proposing cures
for the ills of American medicine.6
' I speak from experience on this matter, having been the senior social policy
advisor to Walter Mondale during his 1984 presidential campaign. Literally no one
in that campaign thought it possible to discuss national health insurance, although
the rising costs of medical care was a theme in the Mondale campaign's attack on
President Reagan. See Theodore R. Marmor & Andrew P. Dunham, The Politics of
Health Policy Reform: Problems, Origins, Alternatives and a Possible Prescription,
in CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY, HEALTH CARE: HOW TO IMPROVE IT AND PAY
FOR IT (1985).
' See, e.g., Paul Cotton, Preexisting Conditions 'Hold Americans Hostage' to
Employers and Insurance, 265 JAMA 2451 (1991); Emily Friedman, The Uninsured:
From Dilemma to Crisis, 265 JAMA 2491 (1991); Eli Ginzberg, The Health
Swamp, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1992, at A15; Barry Meier, A Growing U.S. Afflic-
tion: Worthless Health Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1992, at Al.
' See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Democrats Get Chance to Turn Health Care Anxi-
ety into '92 Votes, WASH. POST, July 1, 1991, at A12; Elizabeth Kolbert, The 1992
Campaign: Media, Candidates Learn that Attacks Attract Attention, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 29, 1992, at A9.
6 For an overview of the intellectual debate, see Theodore R. Marmor & Mi-
chael S. Barr, Making Sense of the National Health Insurance Reform Debate, 10
YALE L. & POLY REV. 228 (1992).
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To be sure, the health reforms that President Clinton
proposed in September 1993 could not possibly have been un-
derstood in detail from his campaign promises. As a campaign-
er, he understandably avoided the details of health reform or
its implementation. As President, he has different obligations,
opportunities and risks. The product of his unprecedented
Health Task Force was but the beginning of a furious debate,
one that thus far has concentrated more on labels for compet-
ing proposals than substantive policy and political choices.7
Whether the President's plan-or adjustments to it-can com-
mand a majority of the Congress is even more problematic
than the 1993 struggles over his deficit reduction plan and
NAFTA.
Yet, it is worth remembering that, despite the hoopla
about new approaches to "comprehensive" medical care reform,
there is practically nothing new about the problems cited or
the remedies suggested by the current debate. All the reform
principles now celebrated-from universal coverage to fixed
physician fee schedules, from global budgets to competitive
health plans, from employer-based financing to single-payer
plans-were included in the battle over national health insur-
ance in the first half of the 1970s. Indeed, President Clinton's
commitment to employer-based financing-one of the central
principles that distinguishes the President's plan from oth-
ers-defined President Nixon's comprehensive health insur-
ance proposal ("CHIP") in 1974.8
This demonstrates what we know from ample experience:
American politics addresses major reform in fits and starts?
The fragmented nature of American politics makes the process
of reform tricky and unpredictable.1" Moreover, the current
7 Id. at 228-29.
8 For an extended discussion of the policy contests of the 1970s see the schol-
arship presented in the Urban Institute's National Health Insurance: Competing
Goals and Policy Choices (1980). See also PAUL STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982); Theodore R. Marmor et al., The Politics of Medical
Inflation, 1 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 69 (1976).
s See JACK L. WALKER JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PA-
TRONS, PROFESSIONALS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 45-46 (1991) (discussing the policy
world's "issue attention cycle").
1" For a discussion of the political actors and distribution of power in American
politics, see JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES
(1984).
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combination of Presidential commitment, congressional readi-
ness to act, and what might be called the public's permissive
consensus about bold reform does not often arise." Therefore,
it is critical to focus upon the gap between the likelihood that
some reform will pass and the real possibility that it will not
work well over time. Unless the health care debate reflects an
understanding of our historical legacy and the dangers of pro-
vincial naivete, we risk mythical mismatches between problem
and remedy. And unless the debate and ultimate congressional
decisions adequately address implementation questions, we
risk squandering a remarkable opportunity to right the wrongs
of a system that no one defends. 2 Agreement over the flaws
of the current health care system does not assure that pro-
grammatic reforms will correct these wrongs. For this reason,
flaws in the overall reform effort will be more detrimental to
the poor than particular flaws in the reform movement's treat-
ment of the poor. It is therefore important to understand the
parameters of the debate.
II. MAEING SENSE OF THE NATIONAL REFORM DEBATE:
LABELS, IDEAS AND PROPOSALS"
By 1993, the warring camps of medical care reformers and
their distinguishing labels had become familiar elements of
media coverage. Terms like "single-payer" or "managed compe-
tition" served as shorthand for complex arguments and ideas.
This shorthand brought together groups of seemingly like-
minded reformers and made the debate easier for journalists to
cover and, at least in theory, for the public to follow. But the
" See Robert J. Blendon et al., Satisfaction with Health Systems in Ten Na-
tions, 9 HEALTH AFF. 185 (1990). Of those surveyed, 89% reportedly agreed that
the U.S. medical care system needs either 'fundamental changes" or 'complete re-
building." Id. at 188. See generally SYSTEM IN CRISIS: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL
HEALTH CARE REFORM 149 (Robert J. Blendon & Jennifer N. Edwards eds., 1991);
Celinda Lake, Health Care: The Issue of the Nineties, 10 YALE L. & POLY REV.,
211 (1992).
12 See my article on health reform implementation. Theodore R. Marmor, Im-
plementation: Making Reform Work, 2 DOMESTIC AFF. 145 (1993).
" Part II draws extensively from Mark A. Goldberg & Theodore R.
Marmor,... And What the Experts Expect: Among Health Care Factions, A
Common Ground is Emerging, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1993, at C3.
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labels have come to block rather than enhance public under-
standing and have made reform more difficult to achieve."
If such labels were ever helpful, they are no longer. Labels
mask differences within categories of reform-for example,
between different plans called "managed competition"' 5 -and
obscure similarities across categories. It is increasingly clear
that any proposal that could command majority approval with
the public or Congress will draw on understandings, and incor-
porate elements, from a variety of reform plans. 16 These re-
forms should be judged not by their labels, but by their pro-
visions and, specifically, their answers to the basic questions of
who receives insurance coverage and on what terms, and how
it will be financed. Indeed, what is needed and likely-as a
matter of substantive as well as political wisdom-is a fusion
plan.
7
Before the positive case can be made for the principles of
an acceptable fusion plan, there must be less confusion. The
existing approaches to reform and their labels are simply inad-
equate. Public commentary has failed to engage deeply felt
concerns about improving the financing and, for some, the
access to and quality of American medical care."8 To those
Americans not immersed in the arcana of medical care re-
form-which is to say, almost everybody, including most jour-
nalists-the catchphrases of the health insurance debate must
be bewilderingly cryptic. Did any voter, for example, under-
stand President Bush's attack in the spring of 1992 on then-
Governor Clinton's supposed support for a "pay or play" plan or
of Clinton's equally earnest denials of this attack? Less than a
year after that debate, practically no one could remember the
heated exchange.
To help clarify the debate, then, several questions must be
answered. What do these labels-the jargon of commen-
14 Id.
"' See John B. Judis, Whose Managed Competition?, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 29,
1994, at 20.
16 See Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry Mashaw, A Little Gridlock Might Help,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1993, at M5.
1 See A Healthy Compromise, ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 1994, at 17; Robert Pear,
As Is, Clinton Health Plan Isn't Flying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1994, at Al.
"' Robin Toner, Heart of the Health Plan Has an Ever Fainter Beat, N.Y.
TmiEs, Feb. 18, 1994, at A14.
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tary-mean? What is the appropriate relation between a de-
scriptive label and the central ideas about the medical reform
it is meant to signify? And how are the labels and ideas linked
to the details of particular reform proposals? The problem with
the health care debate is that popular labels fail to specify
consistently any particular idea or proposal.
For example, a single-payer plan, according to the labels,
is one in which the government pays for health insurance out
of funds it collects from individuals and, possibly, employers.
Many of the proposals typically sorted into this category are
modeled on Canada's universal health insurance. Canada's
program is administered by the ten provinces and manages to
insure all Canadians for all "ordinary and necessary" medical
care while spending about thirty percent less per capita than
America does. This model, first advanced in American politics
in the early 1970s, has been through a cycle of advocacy and
attack, submersion, and then reappearance. 9 The insurance
industry, which as a whole stands to lose the most from this
reform, has been joined by the American Medical Association
and a number of other groups in opposition to this plan. Orga-
nized labor, especially in rust-belt industries like steel and
automobiles, has been among the most vocal advocates of sin-
gle-payer reforms, and has been joined by groups like Citizen
Action, Consumer Reports, and splinter medical groups such as
the Physicians for a National Plan.
Yet many so-called single-payer plans in fact call for each
state to operate its own disbursement operation, thereby in-
volving more than 50 payers. Single-payer need not mean one
plan for an entire country; it refers to one health insurance
organization within a political jurisdiction. This central idea is
often characterized as "too radical" for the United States. 0
The single-payer label, moreover, tells one nothing about how
health insurance would be financed under any particular plan,
what range of medical benefits would be included, how costs
9 In 1993, its leading advocates in the Congress were Senator Paul Wellstone
(D.-Minn.) and Representative James McDermott (D.-Wash.). See Theodore R.
Marmor, Health Care Reform in the United States: Patterns of Fact and Fiction in
the Use of Canadian Experience, 23 AM. REV. CANADIAN STUD. 47 (1993).
2 Then-President Bush tried to discourage public support for a Canadian-like
system by encouraging fears of "socialized medicine." See Rashi Fein, National
Health Insurance: Telling the Good From the Bad, 39 DISSENT 158 (1992).
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would be controlled within the plan's budget, and other mat-
ters far too important to be considered mere details. The label
itself inadequately describes both the characteristics of the
concrete model to which it refers-Canada's universal health
insurance program-and the central ideas that justify putting
such a model into operation.
"Play-or-pay" has been an even less satisfactory moniker.
It is used to describe proposals in which employers would be
required either to purchase health insurance for their employ-
ees and their families (the play option) or to enroll them in a
public health insurance program and pay a payroll tax toward
the cost (the pay option). But plans that include the pay-or-
play mechanism for financing insurance are often more differ-
ent than they are similar. Thus, as with the single-payer ex-
ample, play-or-pay is an utterly incomplete description. For
example, some play-or-pay plans would guarantee health in-
surance for the unemployed, while others cover only those in
the workplace. Indeed, the question in every proposal is how
universal a plan should be. Some play-or-pay models would
control medical costs through a combination of national and
state spending targets and hospital rate-setting and physician
fee schedules; others would not.21 Calling such different plans
by the same name is no more sensible than assuming that any
car with an automatic transmission is a Ford."
The third label, managed competition, had a far shorter
shelf life than seemed imaginable at the outset of the Clinton
presidency. After Clinton's use of the tag late in the presiden-
tial campaign, the expression was so much in vogue that at a
January 1993 retreat for congressional staff members one
speaker said, "I don't know what we're going to do, but whatev-
er it is, we'll call it managed competition."23
21 For discussion of different play-or-pay plans, see Marmor & Barr, supra note
6, at 264-69.
'2 This particular metaphor-and much of the discussion of labels-is drawn
from Goldberg & Marmor, supra note 13, at C3.
's Annapolis retreat, organized by the Alliance for Health Care Reform, Janu-
ary 3, 1993. Such a cynical embrace of labels-as if they need have no direct con-
nection to the substance of proposals-is hardly surprising in American politics.
Many such examples are available from recent experience; the much-touted welfare
reform legislation of 1988-the Family Support Act-for example, proved to have
such a disappointing gap between aspiration and results that we are again ad-
dressing the "reform of welfare" as America "knows it." A brilliant discussion of
[Vol. 60:83
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By April 1993, however, President Clinton's advisors had
withdrawn from the "managed competition" tag. According to
the New York Times,' health task force officials who briefed
the press "ridiculed" the very expression "managed competi-
tion." Officials tried to distance themselves from those who had
insisted most forcefully that competition among health insur-
ance plans-rather than limits on how much money would be
available to medical care-was the core element in workable
cost control. Whereas "managed competition" and "health in-
surance purchasing cooperatives" were once the rage, the evi-
dent effort became substituting "health security" and "health
alliances" as the defining labels of the President's proposal.
But what ideas were associated with the President's earli-
er embrace of "managed competition"? One central idea was
relatively clear: a restructured medical world would organize
potential patients---"consumers" in marketplace lingo-into
purchasing consortia for health insurance. Medical care provid-
ers ideally would practice in groups, much like health mainte-
nance organizations. Associations of providers would compete
for business from the consortia, and the consortia, represented
by savvy purchasing agents, would use their buying power,
combined with more and better information about the quality
of care from local providers, to try to get good deals for their
members.
But this core proposal could be part of a variety of plans.
Proposals that include or are organized around the core con-
cepts of managed care and regulated competition may differ
radically from one another. For example, some plans would
force doctors into group practices and consumers into buying
consortia; while others would give doctors and patients the
choice of opting out, but would use tax incentives to lure them
in. Some managed care proposals would control the fees
this cycle of enthusiasm and disappointment can be found in Hugh Heclo, Poverty
Politics (Mar. 16, 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). See also
THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSIS-
TENT MYTHS, CONTINUING REALITIES 118-21 (1992).
But such ultimately disappointing cynicism is especially regrettable where the
reform in question involves the country's largest industry, representing one out of
every seven cents of American income.
"4 Robert Pear, Clinton Medical Plan Calls for "Health Security" Cards, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 1993, at A7.
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charged for services patients used outside the "capitated"
plans, i.e., those paid for on a per-capita budget. Other man-
aged care plans assume that fee-for-service medicine would,
like an old soldier, simply fade away, unable to compete on
price with pre-paid provider groups. Some managed competi-
tion plans25 would phase in universal coverage; others, such
as the one proposed by Tennessee Representative Jim Cooper
of the Conservative Democratic Forum in the House of Repre-
sentatives, would not. And only some would put all American
medical care under expenditure targets.
Clearly, these ostensibly different models of reform can
have, at least in some of their variants, much in common. For
instance, the public organization that purchases coverage for
the uninsured and the employees of some businesses in a play-
or-pay plan looks and functions a lot like the purchasing con-
sortium in the managed competition plan favored by the
Clinton Administration. Both, moreover, look and function a
lot like a state board in the state-by-state version of a single-
payer plan. The three reform archetypes, moreover, are by no
means mutually exclusive. For instance, a plan could include
universal coverage to a standard set of benefits as in most
single-payer proposals, build around a base of employer-fi-
nanced coverage as the play-or-pay strategy envisioned, and
encourage the reform of medical care purchasing and provision
as the managed competition strategy suggests.
While such a plan may be possible, whether the American
public will understand that possibility depends, in part, on how
disciplined a debate we have over the President's proposal in
1994 and beyond. And it is for that reason that scholarship
directed at understanding medical care reform is now so im-
portant.
Substituting programmatic fusion for policy confusion is
surely desirable. But what is needed is not a new paradigm,
but no paradigm-an eclectic approach to medical reform that
puts much more emphasis on what works than on its label.
But on what principles would a fusion plan be constructed?
After all, without guiding central principles, the appeal to
fusion is no improvement over the very label-mongering that
PAuL STARR, LOGIC OF HEALTH CARE REFORM (1993). Professor Starr, it
should be noted, was one of the key architects of the Clinton proposal of 1993.
[Vol. 60: 83
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has oversimplified and clouded the debate.
III. GUIDELINES FOR REFORM AND DEBATE
Sensible reform should build on three fundamental princi-
ples. First, the three elements of the medical crisis-cost, ac-
cess and quality-are interconnected. We cannot solve one
problem without attending to the other two. If we put all our
emphasis on controlling health spending (now amounting to
over $900 billion a year), quality and access may well suffer. If
we focus solely on making sure that everybody has health
insurance coverage, costs will rise and quality may erode. And
if we do nothing but improve the highly variable quality of
American medical care, fewer and fewer people will have ac-
cess to more and more expensive services.
Second, reform must work quickly to slow cost increases,
to cover the more than 37 million uninsured, and to lay the
groundwork for improvements in quality. With medical spend-
ing increasing at twice the rate of general inflation, tens of
millions of Americans risk life without health insurance. With
so many suffering needlessly, we ought to be impatient. Fur-
thermore, the longer we wait to fix the medical care system,
the harder the job will be.
Third, health care reform must be approached prudently.
The stakes-health, psychological security and financial
costs-are too high to put all our faith in one theory, model or
mechanism. We should build, to the extent we can, a plan that
minimizes failure in the course of seeking success. It should be
a reform plan that is, to borrow a term from the computer
industry, fault-tolerant.
The development of a fusion plan is in some respects easi-
er than it appears-in part because so much of the work al-
ready has been done. Many of the reform proposals advanced
in recent years-and tagged with one of the three standard-
issue labels-are, more than is commonly acknowledged, ad-
mixtures of elements from the "pure" categories. For instance,
the plan spelled out in September 1992 by candidate Clinton,
which he, and numerous commentators described then as a
managed competition strategy, was in fact something of a
hybrid. Similarly, the Clinton Administration's 1993 proposal,
which uses labels like health security and health alliances
1994]
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instead of managed competition and health insurance purchas-
ing cooperatives, is a hybrid as well.
The basic characteristics of a fusion plan-one with both
substantive and political merit-are literally strewn about,
awaiting assemblage. They include eight basic categories of
reform.
1. Financing. Broad-based financing is required, that is,
the spreading of the costs of medical care, rather than concen-
trating them on the sick, the low-income, or any other particu-
lar group. Employer-based financing is one possibility. But
where the government mandates payment, there is a corre-
sponding public responsibility to limit the cost burden on any
particular group.
2. Universal Eligibility and Broad Coverage. No one should
be without insurance protection against the costs of illness,
injury and disease. Beyond that, health insurance should cover
what Americans regard as "ordinary and necessary" medical
care. Benefits should be free of the obfuscation, nasty surpris-
es, and exclusions patients and medical care professionals
correctly regard as senseless. The core of this commitment is
clear: a plan must cover acute and chronic illness, preventive
care, visits to doctors and prescription drugs. The periphery is
necessarily less certain, but benefits should extend to the care
of the chronically mentally ill, substance abusers and the frail.
These services, however, require special constraints and atten-
tion since they are particularly subject to uncontrollable expan-
sion.
3. Cost controls. Tough cost controls must keep spending
in bounds. This means limiting medical budgets to the nation's
rate of growth, not to multiples of that rate. There are many
details here that may vary, but the workable options all in-
clude a prospective budget limit on affordable outlays.
4. Rewards for the creation of more efficient groups of
providers who are responsive to patients within the discipline
of limited budgets.
5. Measures to simplify health insurance for patients,
payers and providers. These include a standard set of benefits
and a single claims form, instead of the electronic billing and
thousands of different forms now bedeviling us.26
6 Experts estimate that as much as 20% of what Americans spend on medical
[Vol. 60: 83
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6. Clear accountability for the cost, quality and accessibili-
ty of the care provided. This includes better information about
the quality of care-including increased research on the effects
of alternate procedures and data that enable patients and their
doctors to judge the quality of care offered by providers and
provider groups-so as to reduce the amount of unnecessary or
inappropriate treatment. The essential feature, however, is
knowing who is to be held to account for performance. Such a
requirement may well have varying forms in the diverse set-
tings of American states. Explicit attention must be paid to
monitoring the quality of care to groups that are especially
vulnerable-such as the chronically ill-or especially hard to
represent-such as the poor and the scattered.
7. Freedom of choice. Although reform that ignores profes-
sional concerns about autonomy is acceptable, autonomy does
not extend to charging whatever one wishes. Reform that lim-
its patients' choice of doctors is undesirable when dictated by
financial pressures falling disproportionately on less affluent or
more sickly Americans.
8. Means of consultation and redress. Measures that regu-
larly and transparently express patient and provider concerns,
within budget constraints, are essential. This is linked to the
mechanisms of accountability, but also raises separable issues.
For example, Americans have little experience in formal struc-
tures of negotiation among parties interested in the benefits
and burdens of public programs."
None of this discussion of what constitutes standards of
acceptable reform presumes that it will be easy to refine a
reform program, develop political support for it and, not least,
implement the program. But a protracted squabble among
rival factions is undoubtedly a less appealing alternative to
fusion and one that hampers health care equality.
care goes to pay for administration and paperwork-amounting to $180 billion in
1993. Simplification alone ought to save tens of billions of dollars, in addition to
eradicating the non-financial costs of contemporary complexity, confusion and un-
certainty.
' The American penchant for disinterested umpires to resolve clashes of inter-
est makes it difficult to legitimate instructions of bargaining. We lack Europe's
vital instructions of corporatism and the participation of those who will be affected
by public policy in the working out of means to settled ends, and of feeding back
information about performance, glitches and needless conflict.
1994]
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IV. (E)QuAL(ITY) & REFORM
This Article has not yet addressed how to incorporate the
concerns of disadvantaged groups in health care reform. But, if
the normative criteria of Part III are accepted, the decisive
question is simply whether reform that satisfied those criteria
even requires any special treatment for the disadvantaged.
The very idea of disadvantage as the focus of discussion
has a 1960s ring about it, which seems incongruous and yet
necessary in the 1990s. Only in America could universal health
insurance sustain such a discussion. Our social policy imagina-
tions tell us much about our political souls.
Whatever principle we use to classify disadvantage, we
inevitably exclude some groups. One might frame disadvantage
in various ways: by demographic age groups-the elderly and
children; by illness-AIDS, mental illness or chemical depen-
dency; or by market or governmental failure-the homeless,
the hungry and the medically uninsured, all of whom suffer
diminished access to specialized markets. But such categoriza-
tions may neglect blacks or other ethnic groups, immigrants,
the poor, the disabled, the retarded or the chronically ill. More-
over, the principles discussed do not provide clean categories
either. The homeless, the mentally ill, senior citizens and the
undernourished child with AIDS defy attempts to locate them
on a coherent conceptual map. These are not the exhaustive
and mutually exclusive categories rationalists favor. But cate-
gorical thinking-and its ailments-are predictably called forth
by American political culture and institutions.
Unlike European or Canadian health financing programs
and public education legacy, American health policy has not
been based on clear, universalistic principles. We have sequen-
tially developed health policies addressed to the needs of
groups with specific disadvantages. For instance, after World
War II, the progression moved from veterans ("V'A") to the
elderly poor (the Kerr-Mills program), from the elderly (Medi-
care) to other groups of the poor (Medicaid), with the disabled
and sufferers of renal failure added to Medicare only in the
early 1970s. Such an architectural principle produces growth
by accretion; since there will always be disadvantages there
will always be new demands to incorporate new disadvantages.
In the 1960s we stretched the American welfare state to meet
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conditions its designers did not foresee in the 1930s; we must
now spend the 1990s making up for the omissions of the 1960s.
The structure of the nation's social welfare policy rests, of
course, on its political ideology. The core of that political ideol-
ogy is based upon what the state regards as a legitimate
sphere of action and what the citizenry understands as a legiti-
mate claim to mutual aid. One's status as a member of the
American community by itself has never legitimized claims to
public provision of services, with the exception of education.
America has not developed a strong version of what T.H. Mar-
shall once called "social citizenship rights," analogues to the
rather well-developed conception of political citizenship
rights.
28
For every social good except education, American social
policy has rested on the distinction between attachment to and
separation from the labor market. The old-age pension part of
Social Security was designed to help individuals with a firm
attachment to the labor force ride out their detachment once
they retired. Unemployment compensation is similarly predi-
cated on prior attachment to the work force. Even Mothers'
Pensions, the precursor to Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC"), was based on presumptions about attach-
8 As a result, we have had rather unique political struggles over entitlements.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, advocates of the poor were able to secure a legal
right to Aid to Families with Dependent Children for women who would be other-
wise ineligible because they could not meet the state's one-year residency require-
ment. The Supreme Court held that a state residency requirement placed an un-
due burden on the political right of citizens to travel. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 629 (1969). Advocates could not, however, persuade the Court that citi-
zens have a right to some minimum level of subsistence. Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 476-83 (1970). To take a more current example, a federal district
court in New York upheld the right of homeless people to panhandle. Young v.
New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 344 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd & vacated in
relevant part, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990); see also
David Margolick, Freedom for Beggars: New Law for a New Age, N.Y. TIIMES, Jan.
30, 1990, at Al. The district court judge regarded begging as a mode of expression
to be protected under the banner of freedom of speech. To interpret begging as a
voluntary act of free self-expression, rather than as an indicator of dire poverty
and distress, is a cruel and perverse understanding of our political ideology. Noth-
ing could be more emblematic of our neglect of social rights and our near obses-
sion with political rights than a constitutional ruling that civilized democracy re-
quires handing out licenses to beg but not provision of minimal levels of food,
shelter and medical care. The district court decision was later reversed. Young v.
New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984
(1990).
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ment to the labor force, although, the rationale for aid was a
gendered norm that mothers should not enter the labor force,
even if their male breadwinner had died or abandoned the
family.
Therefore, it is quite consistent that when the United
States first turned to establishing a public guarantee to medi-
cal care, we looked first-in the case of Medicare-to those
who had "earned" such a benefit either through prior employ-
ment or by marriage to someone with workforce experience.29
Medicaid, with its grant of medical assistance on the basis of
poverty, was something of an unexpected anomaly. But Medic-
aid provided an exception to our norms of individual self-suffi-
ciency by tying eligibility to the same family-structure criteria
as AFDC or the traditional English Poor Law categories of
aged, blind and disabled. 0
In a society so deeply distrustful of public power and so
ambivalent about income redistribution, medical services can-
not be easily legitimized by claims about the essentialness of
health. Nor can they be legitimized on the basis of equal treat-
ment norms or the obligations of a community to its members.
Thus, we face a plethora of categories, in part because, without
a dominant principle of universalism, providing for the special-
ly needy requires creative and specific demonstrations of why
each claim to social resources is legitimate. Each "client" group
turns to justifications that appear to work in the American
political context: crisis, cost savings and moral desert.
Advocates typically proclaim a crisis for their group. It is a
curiosity of American political rhetoric that demonstrating or
projecting a rapid rate of growth in some problem seems to
command more attention than qualitative descriptions of the
problem itself.3 The problems themselves are less bothersome
than the fear that the problems are growing. The public sector,
it seems, can be mobilized by threats of bigness because we
2 See THEODORE R. MARImOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (1970). Even though
eligibility for Medicare hospital benefits (Part A) turned out not to depend on any
prior work, earnings or contribution record, the dominant image in the fight over
Medicare was that of retired workers-and their spouses-who had contributed
FICA taxes when working.
'1 Id.
"' The incantations of the number of children in poverty is my favorite exam-
ple in the 1990s.
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have inadequate consensus on what constitutes badness.
The rhetoric of crisis is closely tied to that of cost saving.
Each population of the disadvantaged is said to represent an
opportunity to save medical care funds. Money spent on com-
munity-based services for the mentally ill, for instance, could
come from money saved on hospitals and emergency rooms.
Every dollar spent on prenatal care or on food aid, advocates
promise, can reduce future medical expenses by multiples of
two or three. And, in a world of deficits, fiscal efficiency-
targeting money where it helps the most-appears to be one
goal that Americans can agree is worthy.
For Americans, deservingness is the most problematic of
the three classic justifications for governmental action in medi-
cal care. There probably never was a golden age when sickness
and sin were entirely different interpretations of human mis-
fortune, or when the definition of a problem as illness carried
with it an implicit judgment of innocence. But the years be-
tween 1920 and 1970, when the great conquest of infectious
disease occurred, probably came closest to such a golden era.
It is no accident that the United States's belated, and
limited, commitment to public financing of medical care was
forged before the "new" perspectives on health made personal
lifestyle choices a cause of disease, thus turning some of the
sick into sinners once again. We have only to consider AIDS to
see that there is no longer a wall between sickness and sin.
Because of this confusion about the moral status of the sick
person, advocates for the disadvantaged are in a paradoxical
situation. There are political rewards for medicalizing social
disadvantages-such as poverty, hunger and addictions-and
social vulnerabilities-such as old age and childhood. But there
are also political dangers. Advocates have to work hard to
portray their clientele as either free of blame for their prob-
lem-which can be difficult-or as a group that was harmed by
prior public policy and, thus, entitled to compensatory aid.
This choice sharply limits the range of beneficiaries.
The political logic of incremental policy expansion appears
quite different now that we have witnessed the unexpected
repeal of the so-called catastrophic Medicare Act in the 1990s.
Although complicated and incomplete when originally enacted
in 1988, the Medicare catastrophic bill was a classic marriage
of categorical thinking and interest group/government bargain-
19941
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ing within the Washington beltway. Never explained to a wider
American public in understandable terms, and the object of
shrill attack by groups that support themselves by arousing
the elderly's fear of ill treatment, the catastrophic plan fell
victim to one of the most extraordinary campaigns in recent
American politics. Congress became terrified that significant
sectors of the elderly population would regard the program's
redistributive financing as an assault on the well-being of all
the elderly. And this charge stuck despite the obvious fact that
only a small minority among the wealthiest elderly would be
financially harmed. If such confusion can dominate a small
part of the health policy world, one can easily understand how
the fight over comprehensive health reform has produced so
much mischief.32
The thwarted movement towards a catastrophic provision
for Medicare proceeded from the same political assumptions as
do those now pressing for attention to the specially disadvan-
taged in American medical care. Looking back, there was the
assumption that Americans left out-or made worse
off-during the Reagan years were, by the late 1980s, promis-
ing targets for modest reforms. The Reagan fiscal revolu-
tion-combining tax cuts with military expansion and thereby
generating large deficits-has driven most non-incremental
reform off the agenda of American politics. As a result, most of
what now seems possible is tinkering at the edges of current
policy. On the other hand, the consequences of America's flirta-
tion with competitive models of health reform have left us with
the worst of all possible combinations: the most expensive
health system in the world and marked dissatisfaction among
patients, payers and providers. What is required is serious
rationalization of a financing system that is wrenchingly misdi-
rected. What all too often appears likely is a continuation of
misguided incrementalism. This is typified in public policy
discussions by talk of expanding access without changing the
balance of power between providers and payers, and in corpo-
rate and private health insurance circles by wishful thinking
about the wonders of "managed care."33
32 Robin Toner, All of the Above: Following the Crowd on Health Care, and
Getting Lost, N.Y. TnEES, Mar. 20, 1994, at D1.
Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry Mashaw, Reality and Rhetoric, 15 HEALTH
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America remains an embattled site for policymaking in
medical care. Appeals for special help to the disadvantaged
chart the details of some of our victims, but not the shape of
politically viable and institutionally secure remedies. For that,
more than sympathy for America's unlucky and faith in the
durability of altruism will be required. The experience of the
rest of the industrial democracies tells us that a nation can
have universal insurance that aids the disadvantaged. It also
shows that programs concentrated on the disadvantaged be-
come disadvantaged programs.
MGMT. Q. 21 (1993); Health Care Study Group, Understanding the Choices in
Health Care Reform, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. (forthcoming 1994).
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